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ABUSE OF SUPREME COURT PRECEDENT: THE “HISTORIC 
KINSHIP” 
 
DAVID W. BARNES1 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
 In Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, the Supreme Court 
applied a doctrine formulated for patent law to an issue arising in copyright 
law. The Court supplied a rationale for doing so by identifying a “historic 
kinship” between patent and copyright law based on fundamental goals of 
intellectual property law. The Court considered how the rationale applied in 
the particular factual context involved. The Court cautioned that the 
propriety of extending a doctrine developed in one intellectual property 
regime to another depends on the particular legal issue involved. 
Despite the importance of ensuring that new rules are consistent with 
the underlying rationale for intellectual property law and the Supreme 
Court’s cautionary language, lower courts regularly quote the “historic 
kinship” as a justification for applying rules from one regime to another. 
This article surveys all of the cases referring to Sony’s “historic kinship” 
and finds that most lower courts abuse the precedent by failing to consider 
the rationale and heed the caution. The risk created by this misapplication 
of Supreme Court precedent is that new intellectual property rules may be 
inconsistent with the underlying goals or inconsistent with other doctrine. 
  
 
 1. Distinguished Research Professor of Law, Seton Hall University School of Law. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
In 1984, the Supreme Court transformed a statutory provision of patent 
law to a common law rule of copyright and recognized a “historic kinship” 
between the two regimes.2 The new rule limited copyright owners’ ability to 
impose vicarious liability on copyright infringers. Two critical features of 
the Court’s opinion in Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios are 
particularly relevant to lower courts using this ruling as precedent. First, the 
“historic kinship” refers to the shared rationale for limiting inventors’ and 
authors’ exclusive rights.3 Second, the Court encouraged lower courts to 
“exercise the caution which we have expressed in the past in applying 
doctrine formulated in one area to the other.”4 While scholars question 
whether there is indeed any kinship,5 lower courts leap at the opportunity to 
 
 2. Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 439 (1984). 
 3. Id. at 439, n.19; see Part II, infra (discussing this rationale). 
 4. Id. at 439, n.19 (citing Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 217–18 (1954) and Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. 
Straus, 210 U.S. 339 (1908), both of which are discussed in Part III).  
 5. See, e.g., Edward C. Walterscheid, Divergent Evolution of the Patent Power and the Copyright 
Power, 9 MARQ. INTELL.PROP. L. REV. 307, 356 (2005) (stating “at the end of the eighteenth century, 
there was indeed a historic kinship between patent law and copyright law, as the Supreme Court has 
indicated, but today that kinship has largely, if not entirely, disappeared due to the divergent interpretation 
of the patent power and the copyright power by both Congress and the courts in the intervening 200 years. 
That divergence has occurred not so much because of changes in the interpretation of the patent power- 
although there have indeed been some – but rather as a result of the massive expansion that has been 
afforded to the interpretation of the copyright power).  
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apply doctrine formulated in one area to another, often without analysis or 
caution. 
The analysis in this article is based on a simple proposition: it is 
improper to take a statement of the Supreme Court (or other authority) out 
of context and cite it without support or justification. The support may be in 
the form of precedent from another authority. The justification may come 
from considering the Supreme Court’s rationale and heeding the Supreme 
Court’s caution. During the three-plus decades following Sony, the vast 
majority of lower courts referring to the “historic kinship” have failed to 
mention the rationale and have failed to heed the caution. Thirty-seven 
opinions6 have cited the Supreme Court’s recognition of the “historic 
kinship,” mostly in copyright cases involving issues far removed from 
Sony’s vicarious liability context. The vast majority of these opinions fail to 
refer to the underlying rationale for extrapolating from one regime to the 
other, and if they do, fail to consider whether it applies to the issue at hand. 
The vast majority of these thirty-seven opinions also fail to heed the 
Supreme Court’s caution that there are significant differences between the 
regimes. Only a few mention the caution and fewer actually consider whether 
there are doctrinal similarities that justify extending the rules in one regime 
to another. Since 1984, when Sony was decided, only three of the thirty-
seven cases cited the “historic kinship” in the same legal context, vicarious 
liability, as Sony.7 Since 1984, no court citing the “historic kinship” has both 
considered the rationale and heeded the caution when extending a rule in a 
new legal context. The result of three-plus decades of lower courts blindly 
relying on the “historic kinship” is a growing body of law creating parallels 
between patent and copyright law without detailed analysis or logical 
support. Taking the Supreme Court’s proposition that patent and copyright 
should be treated similarly out of context without analysis is an abuse of the 
Supreme Court precedent. 
 
 6. A Westlaw search in the Federal Cases database for “historic kinship” yields 39 cases. Sony 
itself and another is a duplicate report, see Sovereign Military Hospitaller Order of Saint John of 
Jerusalem of Rhodes and of Malta v. Florida Priory of Knights Hospitallers of Sovereign Order of Saint 
John of Jerusalem, Knights of Malta, Ecumenical Order, 702 F.3d 1279, 1291 (11th Cir. 2012) (vacating 
and superseding an earlier opinion in the same case reported at 694 F.3d 1200 (11th Cir. 2012) without 
any effect on the content of the relevant analysis). That leaves thirty-seven cases that are the subject of 
this article. 
 7. Of the three cases, only Dynacore Holdings Corp. v. U.S. Philips Corp., addressed the same 
issue as considered in Sony. See Dynacore Holdings Corp. v. U.S. Philips Corp., 363 F.3d 1263 (Fed. Cir. 
2004) (discussing vicarious liability through knowingly assisting a copyright infringer). A second opinion 
addressed a closely analogous issue, Promega Corp. v. Life Technologies Corp., 773 F.3d 1338 (Fed. Cir. 
2014) (discussing vicarious liability through inducing or encouraging another to infringe). The third that 
applied a portion of Sony’s analysis, Monotype Imaging, Inc. v. Bitstream, Inc., 2005 WL 936882 (N.D. 
Ill. 2005) (considering whether there were substantial non-infringing uses). See Part III, infra, discussing 
these cases. 
  
88 CHICAGO-KENT JOURNAL OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY Vol 16:85 
Part II of this article explains the Supreme Court’s rationale so that one 
can properly evaluate lower courts’ use of Sony as precedent. The Supreme 
Court’s opinion in Sony facilitated the wholesale transfer of patent law rules 
into copyright law where copyright law had no applicable law. The Supreme 
Court justified its extension of patent law’s vicarious liability rule by citing 
a particular rationale for limiting the exclusive rights of intellectual property 
rights owners. If Sony is to be precedent for extension of other rules, the same 
rationale must apply. Part II A and B explain the rationale and describe the 
balancing process inherent in formulating rules for patent and copyright law. 
Part II C illustrates what the Court meant when it admonished lower courts 
to use caution when treating copyright and patent law as identical. Part II 
establishes a framework for reviewing the thirty-seven cases quoting Sony’s 
“historic kinship.” 
Part III analyzes the use of the Sony as precedent in two kinds of cases. 
The first are cases where the lower court is considering the same legal issue 
as that considered in Sony. A lower court applying a vicarious liability 
doctrine formulated in patent law to copyright law need not reanalyze the 
rationale and caution in Sony because the Supreme Court has already done 
so. The second are cases where a lower court relies on an authoritative higher 
court’s complete analysis when applying Sony to a new legal issue. It is not 
necessary for every court using a legal rule first adopted in one area to 
resolve a dispute in another area. If a lower court follows the precedent of a 
higher authoritative court, the lower court need not reinvent the wheel by 
independently justifying the rule it follows. Opinions falling into either of 
these two categories cannot properly be considered to have abused the 
Supreme Court precedent, even if they do not contain complete analyses of 
their own. 
Part IV demonstrates the widespread failure of courts to consider the 
rationale for and caution underlying similar treatment of patent and 
copyright cases. The legal issues considered in these cases have no obvious 
connection to the issue considered in Sony and no precedential support, yet 
fail to consider Sony’s rationale or heed Sony’s caution. Many such opinions 
include only a bare citation to Sony without further elaboration. In the 
collection of all opinions citing the “historic kinship,” there is a dramatic 
lack of analysis of whether it makes sense to apply a rule formulated in one 
area to another. 
Part V summarizes the history of abuse of Supreme Court precedent 
apparent in the vast majority of the cases citing the “historic kinship.” It 
concludes that, judged by the standard of whether they used the Sony 
precedent correctly, lower courts have been seriously derelict. Failing to 
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consider whether transferring a rule from one area to another makes sense in 
light of the goals and doctrinal substance of copyright and patent law may 
lead to a coherent body of law, but only by chance. Thus, this article 
identifies a threat to the logical development of intellectual property law.8 
 
 8. This article does not consider the historical accuracy of the claim that patent and copyright law 
share an historic kinship. Nor does it consider whether adopting another regime’s rule in a particular 
substantive or procedural context is desirable from a policy or doctrinal perspective. For a thoughtful 
examination of the relationship between patent and copyright law, see Peter S. Mennell and David 
Nimmer, Unwinding Sony, 95 CAL. L. REV. 941 (2007), which concludes that vicarious liability rules in 
patent and copyright have their historical roots in tort law, but come from different tort principles. The 
authors conclude that the “historic kinship” premise of Sony cannot withstand scrutiny because the 
vicarious liability rules have different torts roots. Id. at 941. From Sony’s footnote 19, however, it appears 
that the Supreme Court was not referring to the roots of secondary liability specifically, but rather the 
underlying goal of limiting intellectual property owners’ rights generally. The Supreme Court documents 
these historical roots, as discussed in Part II, infra. Whether examining the historical roots of secondary 
liability from a tort law perspective would have led to a superior result in the Sony context, as Mennell 
and Nimmer suggest, is beyond the scope of this article.  
  Curiously, secondary liability in trademark law also has its roots in tort principles. The Supreme 
Court, however, emphatically denied in Sony that there was any historic kinship between patent and 
copyright on one hand and trademark law on the other: 
We have consistently rejected the proposition that a similar kinship exists between copyright law and trademark 
law, and in the process of doing so have recognized the basic similarities between copyrights and patents. The 
Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82 (1879); see also, United Drug Co. v. Rectanus Co., 248 U.S. 90, 97 141 
(1918) (trademark right “has little or no analogy” to copyright or patent); McLean v. Fleming, 96 U.S. 245, 254 
(1877); Canal Co. v. Clark, 13 Wall. 311, 322, 20 L. Ed. 581 (1871). Given the fundamental differences between 
copyright law and trademark law, in this copyright case we do not look to the standard for contributory infringement 
set forth in Inwood Laboratories v. Ives Laboratories, 456 U.S. 844, 854–855 (1982), which was crafted for 
application in trademark cases. There we observed that a manufacturer or distributor could be held liable to the 
owner of a trademark if it intentionally induced a merchant down the chain of distribution to pass off its product as 
that of the trademark owner’s or if it continued to supply a product which could readily be passed off to a particular 
merchant whom it knew was mislabeling the product with the trademark owner’s mark. If Inwood’s narrow 
standard for contributory trademark infringement governed here, respondents’ claim of contributory infringement 
would merit little discussion. Sony certainly does not “intentionally induce[ ]” its customers to make infringing 
uses of respondents’ copyrights, nor does it supply its products to identified individuals known by it to be engaging 
in continuing infringement of respondents’ copyrights. 
Id. at 855. This quotation confirms the observation in the previous paragraph that the Supreme Court was 
referring to the underlying rights-limiting rationale for patent and copyright law rather than the historic 
roots of secondary liability rules because trademark law shares those torts roots with patent and copyright 
law.  
  Another possible basis for the “historic kinship” lies in the shared Constitutional origin of 
copyright and patent law in the so-called “Intellectual Property Clause,” U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
Edward C. Walterscheid, in Divergent Evolution of the Patent Power and the Copyright Power, 9 MARQ. 
INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 307 (2005), observed:  
This certainly seemed to suggest that there is nothing fundamentally different between the creative efforts of 
authors and inventors, so that “the exclusive Right” afforded to each of them ought to be treated similarly. As we 
shall now see, however, the interpretation afforded the patent and copyright power by both the Congress and the 
courts has diverged widely, particularly in the modern era. 
This quotation supports the Supreme Court’s admonition that courts should use caution in transferring 
the rules of one regime into another.  
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II. THE PRECEDENTIAL ROOTS OF THE “HISTORIC KINSHIP” 
Nineteenth century German philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche is alleged 
to have said that the most common stupidity consists in forgetting what one 
is trying to do.9 In Sony, the Supreme Court tried to decide whether it was 
appropriate to apply patent doctrine to copyright law. The copyright owners 
offered a number of theories on which Sony could be held vicariously liable 
but none applied to the facts of the case. The Court then considered whether 
a statutory rule from patent law should be copied from patent law and newly 
imprinted on copyright law. This Part describes the process by which the 
Court developed the new copyright rule, its rationale for doing so, and how 
it warned lower courts to be cautious when translating rules from one 
substantive law area to another. This article begins with enough of a 
discussion of the facts of Sony that the context for this translation is clear. 
The goal of this Part II is to provide a framework for appreciating what 
constitutes a proper use of Supreme Court precedent by lower courts. The 
analysis shows that lower courts forget what they are trying to do – adopt 
new rules that are based on a logical and prudent analysis. 
A. The Supreme Court’s Rationale in Sony 
To understand the Court’s rationale in Sony, one must understand the 
context in which the claims in Sony arose. This section discusses the facts of 
the case, the relevant legal rules, and why the Court went beyond the 
boundaries of copyright law and imported a new rule from patent law. The 
“why” rests on the Court’s identification of a “historic kinship” between 
patent and copyright law that justified the new rule because of the nature of 
the facts and the legal issue presented. 
1. The Facts and Legal Issue 
In Sony, the Court considered a claim by the owners of some 
copyrighted television shows that the manufacturer of video tape recorders 
(“VTRs”) should be vicariously liable for unauthorized copying of those 
shows by consumers using the VTRs. Under copyright law, vicarious 
liability could be imposed only if Sony, the manufacturer, was “in a position 
to control the use of copyrighted works by others and had authorized the use 
without permission from the copyright owner.”10 Sony’s only contact with 
consumers was selling the VTRs. It had no control over use and authorized 
 
 9. L. L. Fuller & William R. Perdue, Jr., The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages: 1, 46 YALE 
L.J. 52, 52 (1936). 
 10. Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 437 (1984). 
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no particular uses.11 There was no precedent in copyright law for imposing 
vicarious liability when a manufacturer sells equipment with “constructive 
knowledge of the fact that their customers may use that equipment to make 
unauthorized copies of copyrighted material.”12 
It would be possible to impose vicarious liability in such a case under 
patent law. In patent law, a seller may under some circumstances be held 
indirectly or vicariously liable when a purchaser uses the sold article to 
infringe a patent.13 One exception to this indirect liability in patent law is that 
the manufacturer is not liable if the article is “a staple article or commodity 
of commerce suitable for substantial noninfringing use.”14 If the exception 
to this patent rule could be applied in the copyright context, Sony would be 
excused from vicariously liability for consumers’ making authorized copies 
even if Sony should have known customers were also using the equipment 
to make unauthorized copies.15 The Court justified the application of the 
substantial noninfringing use rule by finding that similar policy issues arose 
in patent and copyright law and that it was “appropriate to refer [to patent 
law] because of the historic kinship between patent law and copyright law.”16 
2. The Basis for Finding a “Historic Kinship” between Patent and 
Copyright Law 
The Court did not impress this patent rule on copyright law without 
considering the propriety of doing so. It based the “historic kinship” on three 
cases, all of which analogize copyright to patent and limit the rights of 
copyright owners. The oldest of these cases is Wheaton v. Peters.17 Wheaton 
limited authors’ rights after considered the underlying similarity of the works 
of authors and inventors in terms of the mental engagement necessary to 
produce their works and their entitlement of the fruits of their labors.18 Fox 
 
 11. Id. at 437–38. 
 12. Id. at 439. 
 13. Patent Act, 35 U.S.C. § 271(c) (2010) (stating “whoever sells a component of a patented 
machine, manufacture, combination or composition, or a material or apparatus for use in practicing a 
patented process, constituting a material part of the invention, knowing the same to be especially made 
or especially adapted for use in an infringement of such patent, and not a staple article or commodity of 
commerce suitable for substantial noninfringing use, shall be liable as a contributory infringer).” 
 14. Id.  
 15. Sony., 464 U.S. at 456 (stating “the Betamax is, therefore, capable 
of substantial noninfringing uses. Sony’s sale of such equipment to the general public does not constitute 
contributory infringement of respondent’s copyrights.”) 
 16. Id. at 439. 
 17. See Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. 591 (1834) (involving a claim by Wheaton (and related other) 
to copyrights on their published reports of Supreme Court opinions. Because Wheaton failed to follow 
the legal formalities for obtaining the copyrights, he could not prevent others from publishing the reports).  
 18. Wheaton, 33 U.S. 591 at 657–58: 
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Film Corp. v. Doyal19 also illustrates the long-recognized limit on authors’ 
exclusive entitlements. Fox Film is a tax case where the Court considered 
whether royalties from copyrights are taxable. The Court stated that 
copyright royalties and patent royalties are both taxable because “[a] 
copyright, like a patent, is ‘at once the equivalent given by the public for 
benefits bestowed by the genius and meditations and skill of individuals, and 
the incentive to further efforts for the same important objects.’”20 Note the 
identification of two interests: 1) obtaining benefits for the public and 2) 
providing rewards for creators to further efforts. The two interests are 
essential to Sony’s rationale. As between these two interests, “the primary 
object in conferring the monopoly lie in the general benefits derived by the 
public from the labors of authors.”21 
The third case cited in Sony similarly emphasizes the limits on 
intellectual property rights for the public benefit. United States v. Paramount 
Pictures22 is an antitrust case in which the Court considered whether it was 
legal for producers and distributors of movies to require the performance of 
one copyrighted movie that the licensee acquire a license for other movies 
as a condition of licensing.23 The producers and distributors used a technique 
of utilizing the popularity of one movie (to which it had exclusive rights 
under copyright law) to obtain more theatrical showings of its less popular 
movie to enlarge their monopoly. While the copyright monopoly is necessary 
to provide a reward to the creator of the copyrighted work, “the copyright 
law, like the patent statutes, makes reward to the owner a secondary 
consideration”24 to encouraging access to creative works. Each of these cases 
illustrate the rationale for limiting authors’ and inventors’ rights. 
When developing rules for patent and copyright, the Supreme Court in 
Sony, quoting legislative history, affirmed that two questions are relevant: 
 
In what respect does the right of an author differ from that of an individual who has invented a most 
useful and valuable machine? In the production of this, his mind has been as intensely engaged, as long; and, 
perhaps, as usefully to the public, as any distinguished author in the composition of his book. 
The result of their labours may be equally beneficial to society, and in their respective spheres they 
may be alike distinguished for mental vigour. . . .  
That every man is entitled to the fruits of his own labour must be admitted; but he can enjoy them 
only, except by statutory provision, under the rules of property, which regulate society, and which define the rights 
of things in general. 
 19. Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 131 (1932). 
 20. Id. at 127–28, quoting Kendall v. Winsor, 62 U.S. 322, 327–28 (1858) (stating “that the limited 
and temporary monopoly granted to inventors was never designed for their exclusive profit or advantage; 
the benefit to the public or community at large was another and doubtless the primary object in granting 
and securing that monopoly.”). 
 21. Fox Film, 286 U.S. at 127. 
 22. 334 U.S. 131 (1948). 
 23. Id. at 157. 
 24. Id. at 158. 
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First, how much will the legislation stimulate the producer [by rewarding 
creators] and so benefit the public, and, second, how much will the monopoly 
granted be detrimental to the public? The granting of such exclusive rights, under 
the proper terms and conditions, confers a benefit upon the public that outweighs 
the evils of the temporary monopoly.”25 
The Supreme Court has described the Intellectual Property Clause in 
Article I, § 8, Cl. 8 of the United States Constitution as “reflect[ing] a balance 
between the need to encourage innovation and the avoidance of monopolies 
which stifle competition without any concomitant advance in the ‘Progress 
of Science and useful Arts.’”26 The intellectual property statutes reflect 
Congress’ attempts to address the “difficult balance between the interests of 
authors and inventors in the control and exploitation of the writings and 
discoveries on the one hand, and society’s competing interest in the free flow 
of ideas, information, and commerce on the other hand . . . .”27 But benefit 
to the public through free access is given greater weight than inventors’ and 
authors’ interest in control and reward through the exclusive right to exploit 
the creation. 
In 2016, the Supreme Court reaffirmed this underlying objective of 
copyright law in Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc. In that case, Justice 
Kagan said that the goal of copyright law is “enriching the general public 
through access to creative works” by “striking a balance between two 
subsidiary aims: encouraging and rewarding authors’ creations while also 
enabling others to build on that work.”28 Justice Kagan approved a copyright 
owner’s argument for considering the “objective reasonableness” of a party’s 
litigating position when awarding attorney’s fees because it “enhance[es] the 
probability that both creators and users (i.e., potential plaintiffs and 
defendants) will enjoy the substantive rights the statute provides.”29 Justice 
Kagan’s analysis illustrates how striking the balance sometimes favors 
intellectual property rights holders. 
 
 25. Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 n.10 (1984) (referring 
to what Congress should consider when developing patent and copyright rules and quoting H.R. REP. No. 
60-2222, at 7 (1909)). See also Brett Frischmann, Spillovers Theory and Its Conceptual Boundaries, 51 
WM. & MARY L. REV. 801, 813 n.49 (2009) (stating “of course, the need to balance incentives and access 
is nothing new and has been a long-standing feature of intellectual property scholarship in general and 
the economic analysis of intellectual property in particular.”). 
 26. Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 146 (1989). 
 27. Sony, 464 U.S. at 429. 
 28. Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1979, 1986 (2016). 
 29. Id. at 1987. 
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B. Sony’s Balancing Process 
Sony provides an illustrative example of how lower courts should apply 
the general rationale underlying the structure of intellectual property law to 
particular legal questions. The video tape recorders (VTRs) manufactured by 
the alleged copyright infringers could be used by consumers to record a 
television program at one time and save it for viewing at another time.30 This 
“time shifting” was the primary consumer use for the machine31 and one that 
fell within copyright law’s “fair use” provisions.32 In addition, some 
copyright owners other than the complainants had no objection to consumers 
copying for home use—particularly suppliers of sports, religious, and 
educational programming.33 Permissible copying of these works was also 
noninfringing. There was no precedent in copyright law for imposing 
vicarious liability on a person who should have known that consumers would 
make unauthorized copies of some copyrighted works, but patent law 
provided a useful analogy in its contributory infringement rule of § 271(c), 
discussed in Part II.A.1, above. 
Why is it appropriate here to analogize patent and copyright law in this 
case? Contributory infringement in patent law is limited to “the knowing sale 
of a component especially made for use in connection with a particular 
patent.”34 Patent law does not object to sale of an article that is also useful in 
connection with other patents35 or for other lawful uses.36 The contributory 
infringement rule allows a patentee to control the distribution of articles that 
are “unsuited for any commercial non-infringing use.”37 The exception for 
articles with substantial non-infringing uses (the “staple article of 
commerce” exception) limits that control, thereby achieving the proper 
balance of incentives through exclusive rights and public access: 
[I]n both areas the contributory infringement doctrine is grounded on the 
recognition that adequate protection of a monopoly may require the courts to look 
beyond actual duplication of a device or publication to the products or activities 
that make such duplication possible. The staple article of commerce doctrine 
 
 30. Sony, 464 U.S. at 423.  
 31. Id. at 423. The copyright owners offered no evidence of decreased television viewing by 
Betamax owners. Id. at 424.  
 32. Id. at 454–55. 
 33. Id. at 424. 
 34. Id. at 440. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. at 441–42 (quoting Henry v. A.B. Dick Co., 224 U.S. 1, 48 (1912), stating “[A] sale of an 
article which though adapted to an infringing use is also adapted to other and lawful uses, is not enough 
to make the seller a contributory infringer. Such a rule would block the wheels of commerce”), overruled 
on other grounds by Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502, 517 (1917). 
 37. Sony, 464 U.S. at 440 (quoting Dawson Chemical Co. v. Rohm & Hoss Co., 448 U.S. 176, 198 
(1980).  
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must strike a balance between a copyright holder’s legitimate demand for 
effective—not merely symbolic—protection of the statutory monopoly, and the 
rights of others freely to engage in substantially unrelated areas of commerce. 
Accordingly, the sale of copying equipment, like the sale of other articles of 
commerce, does not constitute contributory infringement if the product is widely 
used for legitimate, unobjectionable purposes. Indeed, it need merely be capable 
of substantial noninfringing uses.38 
The Court recognized “substantial differences”39 between patent and 
copyright law, but stated that in both areas, courts must look beyond actual 
duplication of a patented device or copyrighted work and strike this 
balance.40 
Meaningful copyright protection, like patent protection, requires that 
owners of intellectual property be able to control articles provided by indirect 
infringers that can only be used by direct infringers to violate the owner’s 
rights. But allowing a copyright or patent owner to block sale of a commodity 
with substantial non-infringing uses would inappropriately “block the 
wheels of commerce.”41 Free access to commodities with noninfringing use 
in both regimes trumps the exclusive right to control distribution. Thus, the 
legal question became whether the VTRs have substantial noninfringing 
uses. The Court found that they did because both copying of TV shows 
broadcast by those who did not object to copying and time shifting were 
lawful uses.42 
Implicit in this recitation is the assertion that a lower court properly 
citing the “historic kinship” as authority for adopting a rule other than the 
vicarious liability rule of Sony from one regime to another should engage in 
a similar exercise to see whether doing so would further the underlying 
rationale.43 A review of lower court opinions citing the “historic kinship” 
shows that they routinely fail to do so. Only six of the thirty-seven cases 
referring to the “historic kinship” even mentioned the rationale and only four 
considered whether extending a rule from one regime to another was 
consistent with the goals of intellectual property law.44 The implication of 
this failure is that rules from one regime may be arbitrarily or inappropriately 
translated to another and potentially work against the stated goals of patent 
and copyright law. 
 
 38. Id. at 442. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Henry v. A.B. Dick Co., 224 U.S. 1, 48 (1912).  
 42. Sony, 464 U.S. at 456. 
 43. A lower court that applied the new Sony contributory liability rule would, of course, not need to 
do so because it can rely on Sony for authority. See Part III, infra, discussing cases.  
 44. See Table I, infra. 
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C. Using Caution When Translating Rules from One Regime to Another 
Sony also provides illustrative examples of why courts must use caution 
when translating rules from one regime to another. The Court cites Bobbs-
Merrill Co. v. Straus45 and Mazer v. Stein,46 two widely cited copyright cases 
that compare patent and copyright law. The distinction in both cases arises 
from the nature of the fundamental rights awarded to authors and inventors. 
A copyright gives authors an exclusive right to copy, distribute, and sell 
copies of a work.47 Patent law, by contrast, gives creators an exclusive right 
to prevent others from making, using, selling, or offering to sell useful 
articles.48 In Bobbs-Merrill, the Court quoted Judge Lurton, who stated: 
There are such wide differences between the right of multiplying and vending 
copies of a production protected by the copyright statute and the rights secured 
to an inventor under the patent statutes, that the cases which relate to the one 
subject are not altogether controlling as to the other.49 
These differences require different legal rules in the two regimes. 
The fundamental differences between patent and copyright law was also 
important in Mazer because the issue was whether an artistic creation 
(specifically, a sculpture) that was incorporated into a useful manufactured 
article (specifically, as the base of a table lamp) could be copyrighted.50 The 
Supreme Court dismissed the potential overlap between copyright and patent 
law in Mazer by recognizing that a copyright gives no exclusive right to the 
underlying useful idea. In Mazer, the useful idea was supporting a table lamp 
by a sculptural figure. Copyright only grants the exclusive right to prevent 
others from copying the particular artistic creation, here, the appearance of 
the particular statuettes.51 Whether the useful idea is protectable is the 
domain of patent law.52 Thus, the Court in Mazer held that there was nothing 
 
 45. See generally Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus, 210 U.S. 339, 339–51 (1908). 
 46. See generally Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 201–221 (1954). 
 47. Additional rights subsequently bestowed on authors by copyright law appears in 17 U.S.C. § 
106 of the Copyright Act. 
 48. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(a): “Except as otherwise provided in this title, whoever without authority 
makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells any patented invention, within the United States or imports into the 
United States any patented invention during the term of the patent therefor, infringes the patent.” 
 49. John D. Park & Sons Co. v. Hartman, 153 F. 24, 28 (6th Cir. 1907). 
 50. Mazer, 347 U.S. at 202. 
 51. Id. at 217 (stating “Unlike a patent, a copyright gives no exclusive right to the art disclosed; 
protection is given only to the expression of the idea—not the idea itself.)” 
 52. See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (stating “Inventions patentable: Whoever invents or discovers any new and 
useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement 
thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title.”) 
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to bar copyright protection for artistic works whose intended use was in 
industrial applications.53 
The Court’s cautionary language focuses lower courts’ attention on the 
differing approaches of patent and copyright law to different legal issues and 
requires lower courts to focus on the particular legal issue they are 
considering. The fundamental nature of copyrightable as opposed to 
patentable works was the focus of the Court’s concern in Mazer because the 
legal issue was whether the artistic works in question were the type of subject 
matter that could be protected. The Court applied different rules in copyright 
and patent law because each covers different subject matter. Each has a 
distinct statutory provision providing for different coverage.54 It would, 
therefore, be inappropriate to import into copyright law a subject matter rule 
from patent law. 
To exercise caution about extending the rule from one regime into 
another, a court should focus on differences between patent and copyright 
law as they relate to the specific issue at hand. The court in Sony did so by 
comparing the regimes’ vicarious liability rules in light of the underlying 
rationale for protection of inventions and authored works.55 Sony also cited 
other cases in which patent and copyright law were compared – each time 
focusing on the specific legal issues and facts presented in those cases. In 
Fox Film,56 the Court said that, when considering the taxation of copyright 
royalties, “in this aspect royalties from copyrights stand in the same position 
as royalties from the use of patent rights.”57 In Paramount,58 the Court said 
that, when consider the anticompetitive effects of licenses granted by 
copyright and patent owners, “a copyright may no more be used than 
 
 53. Mazer, 347 U.S. at 218 (stating “We find nothing in the copyright statute to support the 
argument that the intended use or use in industry of an article eligible for copyright bars or invalidates its 
registration. We do not read such a limitation into the copyright law.)” 
 54. Compare 17 U.S.C. § 102 (describing the subject matter of copyright) with 35 U.S.C. § 101 
(describing the subject matter of patent law). 
 55. The Court in Mazer refers to the rationale after distinguishing patentable and copyrightable 
subject matter: 
The copyright law, like the patent statutes, makes reward to the owner a secondary consideration.” United States 
v. Paramount Pictures, 334 U.S. 131, 158 (1948). However, it is “intended definitely to grant valuable, enforceable 
rights to authors, publishers, etc., without burdensome requirements; ‘to afford greater encouragement to the 
production of literary (or artistic) works of lasting benefit to the world.’” Washingtonian Pub. Co. v. Pearson, 306 
U.S. 30, 36 (1939). 
The economic philosophy behind the clause empowering Congress to grant patents and copyrights is 
the conviction that encouragement of individual effort by personal gain is the best way to advance public welfare 
through the talents of authors and inventors in ‘Science and useful Arts.’ Sacrificial days devoted to such creative 
activities deserve rewards commensurate with the services rendered.  
  Mazer, 347 U.S. at 219. 
 56. Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123 (1932). 
 57. Id. at 131 (emphasis added). 
 58. United States v. Paramount Pictures, 334 U.S. 131 (1948). 
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a patent to deter competition between rivals in the exploitation of their 
licenses.” Both cases appropriately limit their conclusions about the 
similarities or differences to the particular question at hand—taxation and 
competition policy, respectively. 
The preceding discussion of how to apply the cautionary language of 
Sony indicates that a lower court properly citing the “historic kinship” as 
authority for adopting a rule other than the vicarious liability rule of Sony 
from one regime to another should engage in a similar exercise to see 
whether the two regimes are fundamental similar with respect to the issue in 
question. A review of lower court opinions citing the “historic kinship” 
shows that they routinely fail to use caution. Only seven of the thirty-seven 
cases referring to the “historic kinship” considered whether patent and 
copyright law were doctrinally similarly enough to justify applying a rule 
formulated for one area in another.59 The vast bulk of the cases mechanically 
quoted Sony’s cautionary language without further analysis. Of the thirty-
seven cases quoting the “historic kinship” language of Sony, only two 
referred to both the rationale and the caution and fully analyzed both whether 
the rationale applied and whether it was doctrinally appropriate to treat the 
two areas similarly.60 The implication of this failure is that rules from one 
regime may be again be arbitrarily or inappropriately translated to another. 
III. EXCUSABLE LACK OF ANALYSIS 
The preceding review of lower courts’ use of Supreme Court precedent 
slightly overstates the abysmal record of abuse. Dynacore Holdings Corp. v. 
U.S. Philips Corp.61 was the only court that cited both Sony’s rationale and 
caution when addressing the vicarious liability in copyright law issue 
presented in Sony. It would be redundant and therefore unnecessary for 
courts facing this issue to repeat Sony’s analysis when they can justifiably 
rely on Sony’s precedent because of the identical issue involved. For that 
reason, the dissenting judge in Promega Corp. v. Life Technologies Corp.62 
and the court in Monotype Imaging, Inc. v. Bitstream, Inc.63 might also be 
excused from referring to either the rationale or the caution. Promega 
considered vicarious liability of a slightly different sort, inducing or 
encouraging another to infringe a copyright rather than knowingly assisting 
 
 59. See infra Table I. 
 60. See infra Table I. 
 61. Dynacore Holdings Corp. v. U.S. Philips Corp., 363 F.3d 1263 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (discussing the 
rationale for limiting vicarious liability in patent and copyright law). 
 62. Promega Corp. v. Life Technologies Corp., 773 F.3d 1338, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (Prost, C.J., 
dissenting). 
 63. Monotype Imaging, Inc. v. Bitstream, Inc., 2005 WL 936882, at *6 n.5 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 21, 2005).  
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another’s infringement as in Sony. Monotype Imaging did not refer to the 
“historic kinship” or to Sony in the context of vicarious liability but rather 
when evaluating whether comparing the number of infringing and non-
infringing uses in which the defendant had engaged.64 Since this factual 
question is similar to the substantial non-infringing use question involved in 
Sony,65 the Monotype court’s quick reference to the “historic kinship” is also 
probably acceptable. Thus, these three cases should be removed from the list 
of thirty-seven courts abusing Supreme Court precedent. 
Fairness also requires looking for additional examples of lower courts 
that followed higher courts’ precedent that had properly followed Sony’s 
guidance when apply a rule formulated in one regime to another. The greater 
the number of such instances, the less egregious is the history of lower court 
abuse of Supreme Court precedent. The most notable opinion citing the 
“historic kinship” and setting precedent for lower courts involving a legal 
issue other than vicarious copyright liability is Harris v. Emus Records 
Corp.,66 which involved transferability of copyright licenses. Harris both 
applied the rationale and considered the Supreme Court’s caution before 
applying a patent law rule to copyright. Perhaps this not surprising because 
Harris was decided the same year as Sony and had the fresh Sony opinion in 
front of it.67 Six other subsequent opinions referred to the “historic kinship” 
also involved this licensing question68 and two others arguably involved 
related licensing issues.69 Because Harris applied the rationale to the 
licensing context and followed the Supreme Court caution and four of these 
opinions properly cited Harris as authority, their references to the “historic 
kinship” cannot be considered abuse. The other two licensing cases, Cincom 
Systems, Inc. v. Novelis Corp.,70 can perhaps be excused for not engaging in 
a detailed analysis given that the legal issue (transferability of copyright 
licenses) had been well-settled by Harris (albeit in a different circuit) 
 
 64. Id.   
 65. See text accompanying notes 14 to 17, describing the factual context. 
 66. Harris v. Emus Records Corp., 734 F.2d 1329, 1333 (9th Cir. 1984). 
 67. The second most faithful consideration of the rationale and caution appears in an antitrust case, 
where a balancing of procompetitive benefits and anticompetitive harms associated with various practices 
(here, licensing conditions) are to be expected. See In re Indep. Serv. Organizations Antitrust Litig., 989 
F. Supp. 1131, 1143 (D. Kan. 1997). See infra Table I. 
 68. SQL Solutions Inc. v. Oracle Corp., 1991 WL 626458, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 18, 1991); In re 
Patient Educ. Media, 210 B.R. 237, 241 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1997); Gardner v. Nike, Inc., 279 F.3d 774, 
778 (9th Cir. 2002); In re Buildnet, Inc., 2002 WL 31103235, at *5 n.3 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. Sep. 20, 2002); 
Cincom Systems, Inc. v. Novelis Corp., 2007 WL 128999, at *2 n.5 (S.D. Ohio Jan. 12, 2007); Cincom 
Systems, Inc. v. Novelis Corp., 581 F.3d 431, 435 n.2 (6th Cir. 2009); see infra Table I. 
 69. See Twin Books Corp. v. Walt Disney Co., 877 F. Supp. 496, 500 (N.D. Cal. 1995) rev’d 83 
F.3d 1162 (9th Cir. 1996); Davis v. Blige, 505 F.3d 90, 104 (2d Cir. 2007); see infra Table I. 
 70. See Cincom Systems, Inc. WL 128999, at *2 n.5; Cincom Systems, Inc., 581 F.3d at 435 n.2 in 
Table I, infra.  
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twenty-five years earlier. Twin Books involved licensee estoppel71 and Davis 
involved the prospective nature of licenses72 rather than transferability but 
cited Harris for the proposition that patent and copyright licensees should be 
treated similarly.73 These eight cases probably should not be considered 
abusive. On the other hand, at least one case not involving licensing 
inappropriately cites Harris as authority for transferring a rule from one area 
to another without further analysis.74 
Among all the other cases citing the “historic kinship,” there are a few 
in which several courts addressed the same legal issues. If later opinions 
properly relied on the thorough prior analysis of a higher authority, like 
Harris, these later opinions are not abusive. In the three preemption cases,75 
and three right-to-a-jury-trial cases,76 however, there is no analysis of the 
rationale or caution appearing in Sony, even though the legal issues are 
entirely different from the Sony’s vicarious liability question, nor did the 
later courts cite the earlier as supporting precedent. These cases stand in the 
same “abusive” category as the overwhelming majority of the thirty-seven 
cases that blindly cite Sony without considering whether the rationale for 
intellectual property protection applies or whether patent and copyright are 
similar enough to justify transferring a rule from one area to another. 
This review suggests that twelve of the thirty-seven cases should not be 
considered abusive. The three cases citing the “historic kinship” in the same 
context of patent and copyright vicarious liability are not abusing the 
precedent by failing to reanalyze the rationale or obey the caution. The 
principle also applies to courts extending the logic of the historic kinship to 
new legal issues. The Ninth Circuit’s opinion in Harris v. Emus Records 
Corp.77 and the cases citing it in the licensing context illustrate such an 
extension. Thus, there are 25 out of the thirty-seven cases that failed properly 
to consider the rationale and caution. 
 
 71. Twin Books, 877 F. Supp. at 500. 
 72. Davis, 505 F.3d at 104. 
 73. See Twin Books, 877 F. Supp. at 500; Davis, 505 F.3d at 104. 
 74. See Hendricks & Lewis PLLC v. Clinton, 766 F.3d 991, 996 (9th Cir. 2014) (execution of 
copyright to satisfy a judgment); infra Table I.  
 75. See American Assoc. Med. Colleges v. Carey, 728 F. Supp. 873, 880 n.6 (N.D.N.Y. 1990) (rev’d 
sub nom. American Assoc. Med. Colleges v. Cuomo, 928 F.2d 519 (2nd Cir. 1991)); Ultra-Precision 
Mfg., Ltd. v. Ford Motor Co., 411 F.3d 1369, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2005); Carson Optical, Inc. v. Prym 
Consumer USA, Inc., 411 F. Supp. 3d 317, 331 n.5 (E.D.N.Y. 2014); Table I, infra. 
 76. See Taylor Corp. v. Four Seasons Greetings, LLC, 403 F.3d 958, 965 (8th Cir. 2005); American 
Society for Testing and Materials v. Public.Resource.Org, Inc., 78 F. Supp. 3d 534, 539 (D.D.C. 2015); 
American Educational Research Association, Inc. v. Public.Resource.Org, Inc., 78 F. Supp. 3d 542, 547 
(D.D.C. 2015); infra Table I. 
 77. Harris v. Emus Records Corp., 734 F.2d 1329 (9th Cir. 1984). 
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IV. OPINIONS WITH A LACK OF RATIONALE AND CAUTION 
Lower court opinions citing the “historic kinship” without following 
Sony’s rationale or caution cover a vast range of legal issues to which the 
logic of Sony may not apply. The following topics, addressed by courts 
identified in Table I, below, have no logical connection to the vicarious 
liability issues in patent and copyright law that the Supreme Court concluded 
deserved similar treatment: 
Justification for award of attorney’s fee; 
Preemption; 
Requirement of an “actual controversy”; 
Extraterritoriality; 
Suit against U.S. by employee; 
Patent and copyright misuse; 
Contract interpretation; 
Accrual of action; 
Assignee’s right to sue; 
Right to jury; 
Waiver of sovereign immunity; 
Validity of release; 
Copyright registration; 
Remedies; 
Materiality standard for inequitable conduct; 
Use of agency theory in direct infringement; 
Standing in declaratory judgment action; 
Copyrights subject to execution; 
Predicate act doctrine; and 
Compulsory counterclaims. 
Many involve procedural issues (such as the right to a jury trial, standing, 
and whether counterclaims are compulsory) that are entirely different from 
the substantive issue involved in Sony. This list invites further analysis of 
whether each extension is consistent with the rationale for and doctrinal 
structure of patent and copyright law that is beyond the scope of this article. 
The forgoing discussion is not meant to suggest that the courts came to 
the wrong results or otherwise misused authority when deciding these issues. 
This article focuses only on the impropriety of referring to the “historic 
kinship” to transfer a rule from one legal regime to another without proper 
analysis of whether it is proper to do so. All of these areas are, presumably, 
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open for research to consider whether the similar treatment of patent and 
copyright and, apparently, trademark78 issues is appropriate. 
Quite frequently, a bare reference to the “historic kinship” in a footnote 
is all the analysis lower courts employ. For example, John Wiley & Sons, 
Inc. v. DRK Photo,79 involved a copyright question quite divorced from the 
substantive question of what facts would create a foundation for vicarious 
liability as in Sony. The legal issue was the copyright standard for standing 
in the declaratory judgment context.80 The court merely stated that “The 
Court’s reliance on cases concerning patent law is entirely appropriate 
here.”81 The court then cited Sony and another case summarized on Table I, 
Davis v. Blige,82 which involved an entirely different legal issue (licensing). 
There was no analysis of the applicability of the rational derived from the 
historic kinship or of whether copyright and patent law should be treated 
similarly in this respect. In such cases, the bare reference is no support at all 
for applying doctrine formulated in one area to the other. 
A bare citation to the “historic kinship” does not mean that the opinion 
is lacking other support for its ultimate ruling. In this respect, the Federal 
Circuit Court of Appeals opinion in Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson 
and Co.83 is another typical reference to the “historic kinship.” It contains 
considerable analysis of whether its adoption of a “but for” materiality 
standard for patent applicant misconduct is desirable.84 But it cites Sony and 
refers to the “historic kinship”85 without considering whether its adoption 
furthers the rationale for protecting intellectual property generally. While its 
 
 78. See the issue of fraud in trademark applications discussed in Sovereign Military Hospitaller 
Order of Saint John of Jerusalem of Rhodes and of Malta v. Florida Priory of Knights Hospitallers of 
Sovereign Order of Saint John of Jerusalem, Knights of Malta, Ecumenical Order, 702 F.3d 1279, 1291–
92 (11th Cir. 2012). The court rejected an analogy between fraud in patent and trademark applications:  
It was error to look to this case for the applicable standard to analyze a claim for fraud on the PTO. We have been 
admonished to exercise caution before importing standards from one area of intellectual-property law into 
another. See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 439 n.19 (1984). The Florida Priory 
has not pointed to any authority to establish the sort of “historic kinship” that may justify translation of a patent-
infringement standard into the mark-application context. Id. at 439; see also United Drug Co. v. Theodore 
Rectanus Co., 248 U.S. 90, 97 (1918) (noting “little or no analogy” between trademark rights and those of patent 
or copyright); McLean v. Fleming, 96 U.S. 245, 254 (1877) (“Property in the use of a trade-mark . . . bears very 
little analogy to that which exists in copyrights or in patents for new inventions or discoveries....”). 
Id.: See also footnote 9, supra, (quoting the Supreme Court’s view of the similarity between patent and 
copyright on one hand and trademark on the other). 
 79. John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. DRK Photo, 998 F. Supp. 2d 262, 291 n.23 (S.D.N.Y. 2014). 
 80. Id. at 291 n.23. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Davis v. Blige, 505 F.3d 90, 104 (2d Cir. 2007). 
 83. Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson and Co., 649 F.3d 1276, 1295 (Fed. Cir. 2011). 
 84. Id. at 1291–94. 
 85. Id. at 1295. 
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discusses comparable rules in copyright and trademark law,86 the court does 
not consider whether there are differences in patent and copyright (or 
trademark) law that suggest different treatment. Citing to Sony in this way is 
merely a “makeweight” that carries no weight. Again, this is not to suggest 
that the Federal Circuit’s adoption of the copyright/trademark rule is 
inappropriate. It only suggests that the bare citation to the “historic kinship” 
in Sony in this context lacks needed analysis. The lack is highlighted by the 
inclusion of the analogy of trademark law in the comparison after the Sony 
Court denied that trademark law was analogous. 
Overall, the lack of analysis by lower courts is astounding. Since Sony 
was decided, only a few intellectual property licensing cases and one 
antitrust case considered whether the rationale underlying the adoption of a 
patent rule in a copyright case applies when referring to the “historic 
kinship.” Only seven cases consider whether the structures of patent and 
copyright law are similar enough to justify applying doctrine formulated in 
one area to the other. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The underlying premise of this review is, presumably, uncontroversial. 
When citing a higher court for a proposition and applying it in a new context, 
a lower court must determine whether the higher court’s original rational 
applies. When the higher court warns lower courts to use caution when 
applying the proposition in a new context, the lower court must heed that 
caution. Lower courts risk adopting arbitrary and/or random rules by failing 
to consider the rationale and use caution. The bare citation of a higher court’s 
proposition out of context provides no support for a lower court’s conclusion 
or, for that matter, a lawyer’s assertion. Applying a higher court’s ruling to 
a new factual context requires consideration of whether that precedent fits 
the new circumstances. 
In Sony, the Supreme Court provided a rationale for apply a patent rule 
to copyright law and accompanied it with a caution. The rationale was that 
both patent and copyright law are based on the premise that the primary 
object of exclusive patent and copyrights is providing the public with the 
benefits of innovation and original expressive works. To achieve these 
benefits, intellectual property law awards exclusive rights to inventors and 
authors. When considering the adoption of a new rule or interpretation, 
courts should, therefore, consider the balance between incentives to create 
 
 86. Id. at 1295 (observing that “but-for proof is required to invalidate both copyrights and 
trademarks based on applicant misconduct.”). 
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and society’s interest in the free flow of ideas, information, and commerce. 
Caution must be used, however, to ensure that patent and copyright law are 
similar enough in their structure and design that treating them the same way 
is appropriate. The cases cited by the Supreme Court illustrate the balancing 
process and ways in which the differences between copyright and patent law 
require different treatment or the similarities permit the transfer of rules from 
one regime to the other. 
Thirty-seven cases have cited the historic kinship between copyright 
and patent law as support for their interpretation of the law. Table I reveals 
that only two cases, Harris v. Emus Records Corp.87 and In re Independent 
Service Antitrust Litigation88 both apply the Supreme Court’s rationale and 
consider the Supreme Court’s caution. Two groups of opinions should also 
be excluded from the list of those opinions that have abused the Supreme 
Court’s precedent by failing to consider the rationale and use caution when 
applying the Sony rule. In the first, the lower court is consider the same issue 
of vicarious liability and substantial non-infringing use the Court was 
addressing in Sony. If the context does not change in any relevant way, citing 
the precedent without repeating the analysis is not problematic. Of the thirty-
seven cases, three opinions were related to vicarious liability or substantial 
non-infringing use. These are the vicarious liability cases discussed in Part 
III, infra. 
In the second group, the lower court cites the “historic kinship” when 
facing a legal issue in a context already addressed by an authoritative 
(higher) court cited by the lower court. Being as generous as possible, 
perhaps nine cases involving the issue of intellectual property licensing, fall 
into this category. These are the licensing cases discussed in Part III, infra. 
In these opinion, a citation to the controlling authority would be sufficient 
support for applying the rule that higher court borrowed from another 
regime. There would be no independent need for the lower court to cite Sony, 
as each of these opinions does. 
The vast majority of the cases citing the “historic kinship” fail to do so 
properly. Removing the two cases with adequate analysis, the three cases 
properly relying on Sony in the vicarious liability context, and the eight 
licensing cases relying, however adequately, on precedent, leaves almost 
two-thirds of the cases (twenty-four of thirty-seven) abusing the Supreme 
Court precedent. This analytical failure may lead to new rules in patent and 
copyright law that are not determined by reason or principle. 
  
 
 87. See Harris v. Emus Records Corp., 734 F.2d 1329, 1333–34 (9th Cir. 1984) in Table I, infra. 
 88. In re Indep. Serv. Organizations Antitrust Litig., 989 F. Supp. 1131 (D. Kan. 1997).  
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TABLE I: Cases Citing “Historic Kinship”89 
 
Case, reference 
to “historic 
kinship” 
Cited 
Rationale90 
Applied 
Rationale 
Cited 
Caution 
Applied 
Caution 
Legal 
Issue 
Harris91 Yes92 Yes93 No Yes94 Transferability 
of license 
Casella95 No No Yes96 No97 Justification for 
attorney’s fees 
A.A.M.C.98 No No99 No No Copyright 
preemption of 
state law 
SQL 
Solutions100 
No No101 No No Transferability 
of license 
Atari102 No103 No104 No No Existence of 
actual 
controversy 
Subafilms105 No No No No Extraterritorial 
application of 
copyright laws 
Twin Books106 No No No No Licensee 
estoppel 
Matthew 
Bender107 
No No No No108 Justiciability 
requirement for 
declaratory 
judgment 
Herbert109 No No No No No suit against 
U.S. by 
author/employee 
Patient110 Yes111 No112 No No Transferability 
of license 
Ind. Service 
Organizations113 
Yes114 Yes115 No Yes116 Patent and 
copyright 
misuse 
RT Computer117 Yes118 No No No119 Licensing 
contract 
interpretation 
Gardner120 No Yes121 No No Transferability 
of license 
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Buildnet122 No123 No No No Transferability 
of license 
Wechsberg124 No No Yes125 No126 Accrual of 
action 
Dynacore127 No No128 No No Vicarious 
liability 
Silvers129 Majority: 
No 
Dissent 
(Berzon): 
Yes130 
(Bea): No 
Dissent 
Majority: 
No 
Dissent 
(Berzon): 
Yes131 
Dissent 
(Bea): 
No 
Majority: 
No 
Dissent 
(Berzon): 
No 
Dissent 
(Bea): 
Yes132 
Majority: 
Yes133 
Dissent 
(Berzon): 
Yes134 
Dissent 
(Bea): 
Yes135 
Standing: 
Assignee’s right 
to sue. 
Taylor136 Yes No No No Clearly 
erroneous 
standard and 
right to jury 
Monotype 
Imaging137 
No No No No Infringement 
Ultra-
Precision138 
No No No No Preemption 
Cincom 
Systems [I]139 
No No No No Transferability 
of license 
Blueport140 No No No Yes141 Jurisdiction: 
waiver of 
sovereign 
immunity 
Davis142 No No No Yes143 Validity of 
release 
Walton144 No No Yes145 No Jurisdiction: 
copyright 
Registration 
Goldman146 No No Yes147 Yes148 Remedies 
Cincom 
Systems [II]149 
No No No No Transferability 
of license 
Therasense150 No No No No Materiality 
standard for 
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inequitable 
conduct  
Akamai151 No No No No Agency theory 
in direct 
infringement? 
Sovereign 152 No No Yes153 Yes154 Fraud in 
trademark 
application155 
John Wiley156 No No No No Standing: 
declaratory 
judgments 
Carson 
Optical157 
No No No No Preemption by 
patent law? 
Hendricks158 No No No No Copyrights 
subject to 
execution? 
Promega159 No No No No Defining 
inducement 
A.S.T.M.160 No No No No Right to jury? 
A.E.R.A.161 No No No No Right to jury? 
WesternGeco162 No No No No Predicate act 
doctrine 
Touchpoint163 No No No No Counterclaims 
compulsory? 
 
 
 89. This table describes every case in the Westlaw federal cases database that contains the phrase 
“historic kinship.” All cite Sony and all are intellectual property cases except for two antitrust cases 
involving either patents or copyrights. The Table summarizes each lower court’s analysis. The entry in 
each cell inevitably reflects the author’s judgment. For instance, while the rationale for intellectual 
property protection calls for a balance of incentives and access calls for consideration of both the reasons 
for providing incentives for creators and access to the public, some courts focus only on providing 
incentives. The table would record these courts as not having applied the rationale. Similarly, when the 
court does not quote Sony’s admonition to use caution when equating the two areas, courts occasionally 
compare the laws in the two areas to determine whether they are similar enough to support equal 
treatment. For these occasions, the table records that the caution was not cited but it was applied. See, 
e.g., footnote 94. Also, courts occasionally relied on precedent in cases involving the same legal issue or 
a comparison of patent and copyright policy as a basis for applying the rule of one regime to another. In 
such cases, the table reflects no citing to the caution but an application of the caution. See, e.g., footnote 
141. When a court cites precedent for applying one regime’s rules to another regime but the precedent 
involve a different legal issue, the table records no application of the caution. See, e.g. footnote 158. 
 90. The summary entered in each cell indicates whether the court discussed the rationale in the 
context of the legal issue for which the “historic kinship” was cited. As the following footnotes indicate, 
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courts occasionally considered the rationale in the context of other legal issues present in the case, such 
as copyright fair use. See, e.g., footnotes 108, 112, and 113. 
 91. Harris, 734 F.2d at 1333. 
 92. Id. at 1334. 
 93. Id. at 1334 (stating: 
Such an interpretation of a license accords with the policies underlying enactment of the Copyright Act. The 
legislative history reveals an acute awareness of the need to delicately balance competing interests. On the one 
hand, there was a strong reluctance to allow a monopolization of works or compositions; at the same time, there 
was an awareness of the necessity of preserving the rights of authors and composers in order to stimulate 
creativity. H.R. Rep. No. 2222, 60th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1909). Illustrative of the compromises adopted is the 
compulsory licensing provision which permitted the copyright holder to control first use while providing a 
mechanism for others to obtain licenses once first use had been authorized. The notice provision for compulsory 
licenses insures that the copyright owner can monitor use in order to determine that accountings are accurate. The 
same consideration is relevant here. By licensing rather than assigning his interest in the copyright, the owner 
reserves certain rights, including that of collecting royalties. His ability to monitor use would be jeopardized by 
allowing sublicensing without notice. In fact precisely such a scenario underlies this litigation).  
 94. The court stated “A patent license has been characterized as “a naked license to make and sell 
the patented improvement as a part of its business, which right, if it existed, was a mere personal one, and 
not transferable, and was extinguished with the dissolution of the corporation.” citing Hapgood v. 
Hewitt, 119 U.S. 226, 233 (1886) and other cases. Harris, at 1333. The court further stated:  
Such an interpretation of a license accords with the policies underlying enactment of the Copyright Act. The 
legislative history reveals an acute awareness of the need to delicately balance competing interests. On the one 
hand, there was a strong reluctance to allow a monopolization of works or compositions; at the same time, there 
was an awareness of the necessity of preserving the rights of authors and composers in order to stimulate creativity. 
H.R. Rep. No. 2222, 60th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1909). 
Id. at 1334. The court then described how the licensing provisions of the Copyright Act were illustrative 
of this compromise. Id. at 1334. The court did not quote the cautionary language. Its comparison of patent 
and copyright law and principles in the language quoted constitute its analysis of the rationale and caution. 
 95. Casella v. Morris, 820 F.2d 362, 367 n.6 (11th Cir. 1987). 
 96. Id. at 367 n. 6. 
 97. While the court was persuaded by the reasoning of a patent case in this copyright case, it did not 
explain why it adopted the patent rule despite acknowledging the differences. See Casella, 820 F.2d at 
367 n.6 (noting that “Both patent law and copyright law allow awards of attorney’s fees. The standards, 
however, are different: patent law authorizes fee awards in ‘exceptional cases. [Citing 35 U.S.C. § 285.] 
Copyright law has no corresponding threshold: ‘The court in its discretion may allow....’ [Citing 17 
U.S.C. § 505.]” 
 98. American Assoc. Med. Colleges v. Carey, 728 F. Supp. 873, 880 n.6 (N.D.N.Y. 1990). 
 99. The court cited neither the rationale nor the caution in the preemption context, though it did 
discuss the rationale as applied to a separate copyright fair use issue. A.A.M.C., 728 F. Supp. at 882 (“The 
tension between the Copyright Act’s dual goals of greater access to information and its provision for 
exclusivity of ownership rights makes the question of fair use “‘the most troublesome in the whole law 
of copyright.’” citing Maxtone-Graham v. Burtchaell, 803 F.2d 1253, 1255 (2d Cir. 1986) (quoting Dellar 
v. Samuel Goldwyn, Inc., 104 F.2d 661, 662 (2nd Cir.1939)).  
 100. SQL Solutions Inc. v. Oracle Corp., Not Reported in F. Supp., 1991 WL 626458, at *6 (N.D. 
Cal. 1991).  
 101. The court did not reconsider the rationale and did not apply the caution, but cited Harris v. Emus 
Records Corp., 734 F.2d 132 (9th Cir. 1984), which considered both in a case involving the same legal 
issue. SQL Solutions, 1991 WL 626458 at *6 (“The Emus Records court observed that a parallel 
prohibition against the transfer of copyright licenses gave effect to the policy of protecting creativity 
underlying enactment of the Copyright Act.”). Note that this quotation only refers to one half of the policy 
balancing—protecting copyright owners. 
 102. Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of America, Inc., 975 F.2d 832, 841 n.4 (Fed. Cir. 1992). 
 103. Id. at 842. The court does not apply the rationale for treating patent and copyright similarly 
when considering the existence of an actual controversy (for which the “historic kinship” was cited), but 
does cite and apply the rationale when considering the applicability of the copyright fair use doctrine. Id. 
at 842–43. 
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 104. Again, the court does not apply the rationale for treating patent and copyright similarly when 
considering the existence of an actual controversy (for which the “historic kinship” was cited), but does 
cite and apply the rationale when considering the applicability of the copyright fair use doctrine. Id. at 
842–43. 
 105. Subafilms, Ltd. v. MGM-Pathe Communications Co., 24 F.3d 1088, 1092 n.7 (9th Cir. 1994). 
 106. Twin Books Corp. v. Walt Disney Co., 877 F. Supp. 496, 500 (N.D. Cal. 1995). 
 107. Matthew Bender & Co. v. West Publishing Co., Not Reported in F. Supp., 1996 WL 223917, at 
*1 n.1 (S.D.N.Y. 1996). 
 108. The court does not apply the caution as illustrated in Sony but cites precedent for applying a 
patent rule in the copyright justiciability context, Id. at *1 n.1 (citing Re-Alco v. National Center for 
Health Education, 812 F. Supp. 387, 395 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (applying patent standards articulated in 
Wembley v. Superba Cravats, 315 F.2d 87 (2d Cir. 1963) to copyright case)). 
 109. Herbert v. U.S., 36 Fed. Cl. 299, 305 n.4 (Ct. Fed. Claims 1996). 
 110. In re Patient Educ. Media, 210 B.R. 237, 241 n.7 (U.S. Bankruptcy Ct. 1997).  
 111. Id. at 240. 
 112. The court cites the rationale, but in its policy analysis only mentions the policy supporting 
exclusive rights. Id. at 242 (stating “The federal policy designed to protect the limited monopoly of 
copyright owners and restrict unauthorized use constitutes applicable nonbankruptcy law” and observing 
that “the fundamental policy of the federal patent system is to encourage the creation and disclosure of 
new advances in technology.”) 
 113. In re Indep. Serv. Organizations Antitrust Litig., 989 F. Supp. 1131, 1143 (D. Kan. 1997). 
 114. Id. at 1142. 
 115. The court in Ind. Serv. Organizations, at 1143, cites two cases, Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo 
of Am., Inc., 897 F.2d 1572 (Fed. Cir.1990) and Lasercomb America, Inc. v. Reynolds, 911 F.2d 970 
(4th Cir. 1990). These cases cited additional cases involving copyright misuse that had previously 
identified the underlying policies of both regimes as being consistent with treating both the same. See, 
e.g., Lasercomb, 911 F.2d at 976 (“[S]ince copyright and patent law serve parallel public interests, a 
“misuse” defense should apply to infringement actions brought to vindicate either right.”). 
 116. Indep. Serv. Organizations, at 1133–34. 
 117. RT Computer Graphics Inc. v. U.S., 44 Fed. Cl. 747, 758 n.10 (U.S. Ct. Claims 1997). 
 118. Id. at 752. 
 119. R.T. Computer is a case based on 28 U.S.C.A. § 1498 (b), which gives copyright owners the 
right to sue the government for infringement. While the court neither cited the caution nor analyzed in 
detail whether it was appropriate to extend patent law rules to copyright rules, it did quote Boyle v. United 
States, 44 Fed. Cl. 60 (Fed.Cl.1999) (“Section 1498(b) was created when Congress ‘extended’ the 
provisions of section 1498(a) [relating to patent infringement] to permit an action in [the Court of Federal 
Claims] for copyright infringements.”). This reference suggests that it is appropriate to adopt similar rules 
for patent and copyright law. 
 120. Gardner v. Nike, Inc., 279 F.3d 774, 778 (9th Cir. 2002). 
 121. Id. (quoting Harris v. Emus Records Corp., 734 F.2d 132, 134 (9th Cir. 1984)). 
 122. In re Buildnet, Inc., Not Reported in B.R., 2002 WL 31103235, at *5 n.3 (U.S. Bankruptcy Ct. 
2002). 
 123. The court in Buildnet, at *5, referred to only half of the balancing of incentives and access, 
stating “The Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 101 et seq. is intended to grant the copyright owner a limited 
monopoly which provides the owner a period of time during which to reap the benefits of his work.” 
 124. Wechsberg v. U.S., 54 Fed. Cl. 158, 162 (U.S. Ct. Fed. Claims 2002). 
 125. Id. at 162. 
 126. Addressing the cautionary language, the court noted that the defendant’s interpretation of 
copyright law would unfairly result in different treatment of copyright and patent owners who were in 
the same position and, for that reason, rejected the defendant’s argument and applied the patent rule in 
the copyright context. Id. at 163. 
 127. Dynacore Holdings Corp. v. U.S. Philips Corp., 363 F.3d 1263, 1275 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
 128. The court in Dynacore applies the reasoning in Sony related to the substantial non-infringing 
use rule to the patent context from which it was originally derived, making this unadorned use of the 
reference to the “historic kinship” appropriate. See the discussion in id. at 1275. 
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 129.  Silvers v. Sony Pictures Entertainment Corp., 402 F.3d 881, 887, 905, (Graber, C.J.), 905 (Bea, 
J. dissenting) (9th Cir. 2005). 
 130. Id. (Berzon J., dissenting), at 893. 
 131. Id. (Berzon J., dissenting), at 893–94 (quoting the rationale and stating that “I see nothing in the 
assignment of accrued claims of Frank & Bob Films for infringement of a work created by 
Silvers to Silvers that violates these background principles. . . . Silvers, as the creator, is the person for 
whom the copyright system is designed to provide incentives for more creations.”)  
 132. Id. (Bea, J. dissenting), at 905. 
 133. Id. at 888. The majority did not quote the Sony caution but stated: 
Despite the differences between patents and copyrights, and between the statutes governing them, the common 
question is whether a substantive, exclusive right to intellectual property may be divorced from a cause of action 
for infringement of that substantive right. Under both copyright and patent law, substantive rights are assignable; 
the question whether those rights are severable from the entitlement to sue someone for infringing those rights 
requires a similar analysis. 
Id. 
 134. Id. (Berzon, J. dissenting), at 894: 
In general, “patents and copyrights do not entail the same exchange.” ”The disclosure required by the Patent Act 
is ‘the quid pro quo of the right to exclude.’” ”For the author seeking copyright protection, in contrast, disclosure 
is the desired objective, not something exacted from the author in exchange for the copyright.” [Citations omitted.]  
 135. Id. (Bea, J. dissenting), at 905. 
 136. Taylor Corp. v. Four Seasons Greetings, LLC, 403 F.3d 958, 965, 969 (8th Cir. 2005). 
 137. Monotype Imaging, Inc. v. Bitstream, Inc., Not Reported in F. Supp. 2d, 2005 WL 936882, at 
*6 n. 5 (N.D. Ill. 2005). 
 138. Ultra-Precision Mfg., Ltd. v. Ford Motor Co., 411 F.3d 1369, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
 139. Cincom Systems, Inc. v. Novelis Corp., Not Reported in F. Supp. 2d, 2007 WL 128999, at *2 
n.5 (S.D. Ohio 2007). 
 140. Blueport Co., LLP v. U.S., 76 Fed. Cl. 702, 713 (U.S. Ct. Fed. Claims 2007). 
 141. While not citing Sony’s cautionary language, the court cited statutory language justifying similar 
treatment of patent and copyright cases. Id. at 713–14.  
 142. Davis v. Blige, 505 F. 3d 90, 104 (2d Cir. 2007). 
 143. Though the court did not cite to the cautionary language of Sony, the court briefly noted that 
“[l]icenses in patent and copyright function similarly, see Harris v. Emus Records Corp., 734 F.2d 1329, 
1333 (9th Cir.1984), and thus it is appropriate to consider copyright licensing, like patent licensing, 
prospective in nature.” Id. 
 144. Walton v. U.S., 80 Fed. Cl. 251, 264 n.19 (U.S. Ct. Fed. Claims 2008). 
 145. Id. at 264 n.19. 
 146. Goldman v. Healthcare Management Systems, Inc., 559 F. Supp. 2d 853, 875 (W.D. Mich. 
2008). 
 147. Id. at 875. 
 148. Id. at 875–76:  
Copyright protects the expression of an idea, not the idea itself. While copyright protects the original 
expression of the idea, patents protect the innovative idea. Copyright protection does not extend to any “idea, 
procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which 
it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such a work.” Patents encourage technological development 
by preventing others from making, using or selling an invention for a specified amount of time. Copyright 
protection is much narrower, protecting only an exclusive right to reproduce an original expression.  
The ability to achieve the same or similar result using an alternative means may implicate the novelty 
of an idea and hence is relevant to the final assessment of damages in a patent suit, the same cannot be said in a 
copyright suit. Patents encourage innovation. Copyrights encourage originality in expression. Copyrights give the 
holder the exclusive right to reproduce an original or derivative work. If the work is infringed by copying without 
authorization, the copyright holder is entitled to damages for that infringement. The ability to avoid damages by 
rewriting a computer program, or a song, or reproducing a painting, should not be considered because it would not 
implicate the originality of the expression being protected. Those concerns are considered in patent cases precisely 
because the alternatives question the novelty of the patent; if there are alternatives, or could be alternatives in the 
marketplace, the idea is not novel. 
 149. Cincom Systems, Inc. v. Novelis Corp., 581 F.3d 431, 435 n.2 (6th Cir. 2009). 
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 150. Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson and Co., 649 F.3d 1276, 1295 (Fed. Cir. 2011). 
 151. Akamai Technologies, Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc., 692 F.3d 1301, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2012). 
 152. Sovereign Military Hospitaller Order of Saint John of Jerusalem of Rhodes and of Malta v. 
Florida Priory of Knights Hospitallers of Sovereign Order of Saint John of Jerusalem, Knights of Malta, 
Ecumenical Order, 702 F.3d 1279, 1291 (11th Cir. 2012) (vacating and superseding an earlier opinion in 
the same case reported at 694 F.3d 1200 without any effect on the content of the analysis). 
 153. Id. at 1291 (stating “The Florida Priory has not pointed to any authority to establish the sort of 
“historic kinship” that may justify translation of a patent-infringement standard into the mark-application 
context.” 
 154. Id. 
 155. The defendant attempted to apply a patent law standard for fraud on the PTO during the 
application process in a trademark case. The court rejected this attempted based on the Sony Court’s 
denial of any historic kinship between patent and trademark law. Id. at 1192 (citing Sony Corp. of 
America v. University City Studios, Inc., 464, U.S. 417, 439 n.19 (1984); United Drug Co. v. Theodore 
Rectanus Co., 248 U.S. 90, 97 (1918) (noting “little or no analogy” between trademark rights and those 
of patent or copyright); and McLean v. Fleming, 96 U.S. 245, 254 (1877) (stating “Property in the use of 
a trade-mark . . . bears very little analogy to that which exists in copyrights or in patents for new 
inventions or discoveries. . . .”)).  
 156. John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. DRK Photo, 998 F. Supp. 2d 262, 291 n.23 (S.D.N.Y. 2014). 
 157. Carson Optical, Inc. v. Prym Consumer USA, Inc., 411 F. Supp. 3d 317, 331 n.5 (E.D.N.Y. 
2014). 
 158. Hendricks & Lewis PLLC v. Clinton, 766 F.3d 991, 996 (9th Cir. 2014). 
 159. Promega Corp. v. Life Technologies Corp., 773 F.3d 1338, 1358 n.2 (Prost, C.J., dissenting) 
(Fed. Cir. 2014). 
 160. American Society for Testing and Materials v. Public.Resource.Org, Inc., 78 F. Supp. 3d 534, 
539 (D.D.C. 2015). The opinion in this case is almost identical to the opinion in A.E.R.A., footnote 170, 
infra, which involved the same court, defendant, and issue. The cases were decided the same day. The 
only differences are the names of the plaintiffs. 
 161. American Educational Research Association, Inc. v. Public.Resource.Org, Inc., 78 F. Supp. 3d 
542, 547 (D.D.C. 2015). 
 162. WesternGeco L.L.C. v. Ion Geophysical Corp., 621 Fed. Appx. 663, 664 (Wallach, C.J. 
dissenting) (Fed. Cir. 2015). 
 163. Touchpoint Communications, LLC v. Dentalfone, LLC, Slip Copy 2016 WL 524260, at *4 
(W.D. Wash. February 10, 2016). 
